It is not only
Introduction
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture was seen in 1994 as only a first step towards the liberalisation of agricultural trade. In Article 20 of the Agreement it was required that further negotiations should take place in order to continue the process of liberalisation (WTO 1995, p. 55) . These negotiations began in 2000 and were subsequently incorporated into the single undertaking of the Doha Round in 2001. The aim of the negotiations is 'to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets' (WTO 2001, para 13) . Fairness is to be achieved through incorporating special and differential treatment for the developing and least-developed countries, and efficiency is to be achieved through improving market access, phasing out all forms of export subsidies and substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support.
In the Punta del Este Declaration of 1986 there is the clear indication it was realised by the Contracting Parties to the GATT that improving market access and reducing domestic and export subsidies would in all likelihood cause governments to shift support and protection towards sanitary and phytosanitary barriers as a means of continuing to pursue their objective of supporting farmers' incomes. Therefore, an additional element in the Uruguay Round negotiations was to find ways of 'minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture ... .' (Croome 1995, p. 387) . The outcome was the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (The SPS Agreement). In this Agreement, governments are to use recognised international standards in setting their quarantine barriers or, if they choose to impose a higher standard, then a scientific risk assessment is required. In this way, governments are required to demonstrate that their choice of import barrier can be justified in terms of its nature and setting, that the motivation for it is to achieve an acceptable level of risk, that it achieves that level in a minimally trade-distorting way, and that it is not in place to protect domestic producers from competing imports.
The introduction of the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture have been significant, albeit cautious, first steps in helping to achieve more efficiency, more predictability and more equity internationally in markets for agricultural products.
1 However, much remains to be done to achieve a market-oriented system and the slow place of the negotiations on agriculture since 2000 provides an indication of how difficult the next steps will be.
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The objective in the paper is to make the case that the WTO matters a great deal for international trade in agricultural products and for the welfare of the international community, particularly the developing and least-developed country members for whom agriculture is especially important. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 there is a brief summary of the current state of play in the agricultural negotiations as required by Article 20. An explanation for the current apparent impasse in the negotiations is provided in section 3 by considering the political economy of government intervention in agriculture and the social norms on which that intervention is based. These two sections provide evidence to support the argument that the WTO is necessary as a coordinating institution within which governments can attempt to resolve their substantial differences over the rules for agriculture.
This argument is put in Section 4, while some conclusions are presented in section 5.
The Current Impasse
During the years of GATT 1947, agriculture was largely neglected in the various negotiating rounds. 3 This outcome arose for two reasons. First, agriculture was not subject to the same restrictions on the use of instruments as was the manufacturing sector, e.g., import quotas and export subsidies were permitted for trade in agricultural products but not 1 Another WTO Agreement of some relevance to agriculture is the TRIPS Agreement because of the current demand, particularly by the European Union, for geographic indications to be recognised. This topic is not pursued in the remainder of the paper. 2 The SPS Agreement is not on the negotiating agenda in the Doha Round. 3 For a detailed history of agriculture in the GATT, see Josling et al. (1996) .
for trade in manufactures; and second, reciprocal tariff reductions were the principal focus of the negotiations in these rounds and agricultural trade in general was not restricted by tariffs.
It is generally agreed that the GATT rules for agriculture during the period prior to the Uruguay Round were woefully inadequate in the attempt to bring order to international markets and to prevent the accompanying and unnecessary welfare losses. In addition, the dispute settlement process during this period was also deficient as a means for a contracting party to prevent these losses of welfare which were caused by actions of other contracting parties.
It became accepted during the 1980s that the fundamental source of the trade problems in agriculture was really the pursuit of domestic objectives and the instruments used to achieve them, rather than agricultural trade policy per se. Thus the outcome for agriculture of the Uruguay Round can be seen as a significant departure from previous rounds in that domestic instruments as well as trade instruments were subject to new constraints. In particular, all non-tariff barriers were converted to tariffs, subject to reductions, and then bound. Domestic policy instruments were classified into one of three boxes (amber, blue and green) ranging from trade distorting to minimally trade distorting, respectively, with total support in the amber box subject to reduction; and assistance to exports was also reduced and bound. Market access was to be guaranteed through the use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and, through Article 13 (the 'Peace Clause'), agricultural subsidies which were in accordance with There exist several accounts of the outcome of the Uruguay Round, its implementation and its shortcomings.
In addition to Josling et al. (1996) , the most concise sources are those which were published by the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium in a series of commissioned papers (see <http://iatrcweb.org>). 5 In the area covered by the SPS Agreement there continues to be tension on a bilateral basis but these disagreements are being resolved through the Dispute Settlement Body.
stability of farm incomes, the productivity of labour employed in agriculture, the security of food supply and the efficient marketing of agricultural products.
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The second explanation is that some governments appear to believe that the agricultural sector is somehow special and that the principles of economics should not apply to it at all or at least should not be applied as rigorously as they are in other sectors. 7 The special characteristics of agriculture are claimed to include inter alia the link between food production and culture, between food production and landscape, and between food production and the viability of rural communities. These special characteristics are part of the so-called multifunctional agenda which is based largely on the notion that the agricultural sector produces not only food and fibre but also public goods and positive externalities. 8 The multifunctional agenda is a subset of the agenda covered by the term 'non-trade concerns'.
This agenda also includes food safety (including the controversial issue of GM foods), food security, geographic indications, animal welfare and biological diversity. The issues raised by 'non-trade concerns' has further divided Members but the issues cannot be avoided altogether because, under Article 20, they are required to be part of the agenda.
Another cause of disagreement has been the scheduled expiry of the 'Peace Clause' which has exempted agricultural subsidies from challenge in the Dispute Settlement Body, so long as they are consistent with the Agreement. Some countries having proposed that the Article should not be allowed to expire, while others have proposed that it should expire and that, henceforth, agricultural subsidies ought to lose their special status and, therefore, ought to be treated according to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For a discussion of these non-economic objectives, see Winters (1990) . He regarded them as so-called noneconomic objectives. 7 For a detailed discussion of how agriculture is thought to be special and why the application of economic principles ought to be suspended, according to some governments, see WTO (2000b) . In this document a set of discussion papers is provided which represent the positions adopted on non-trade concerns by the EU and by the governments of Japan, Korea, Mauritius, Norway and Switzerland. 8 The analysis of multifunctionality has been bedevilled by a lack of definition of the term. The OECD (2001) has chosen to use 'commodity outputs' and 'non-commodity outputs' in its economic analysis. 9 It might appear from a non-lawyer's reading of Article 13 that it is obvious what should have happened at the end of 2003 when the Article was due to expire. However, the issue seems to be much more complicated as explained in Steinberg and Josling (2003) . Further background and analysis is provided in Morgan and Goh (2003) . Part of the text on Market Access reads as follows:
2.1 The formula applicable for tariff reduction by developed countries shall be a blended formula under which each element will contribute to substantial improvement in market access for all products. The formula shall be as follows: It is clear from the number of empty square brackets in the foregoing that under each heading of the negotiations there is almost no agreement on how to improve market access, by how much to reduce domestic support, or the time period over which export subsidies are to be phased out altogether. Why there remain substantial disagreements is explained in the next section.
Explaining Agricultural Policy
The quote at the beginning of this paper reflects accurately the separation of policy objectives from policy instruments adopted by economists when undertaking the analysis of economic policies, including agricultural policies. It also reflects the extent to which the Australian Government has adopted the economic approach on matters of agricultural policy.
Given a non-economic objective, it is possible using the tools of welfare economics to identify the best instrument to achieve the objective in the sense of minimising the deadweight costs of the intervention. If transfer efficiency is defined as the net benefit to producers divided by the cost to consumers and taxpayers of transferring a dollar's worth of net benefit, then the economist's policy advice to government is that it should choose the instrument with the highest transfer efficiency (i.e., as close to unity as possible). 10 In some instances it is also possible to derive a ranking of instruments according to their transfer efficiencies. This approach is very much in the tradition of the targeting rule which was developed by Corden (1957) , generalised by Bhagwati (1971) and extended by Srinivasan (1996) .
As an example of this type of analysis, consider how income support for farmers, which has been, and remains, an over-riding objective of agricultural policy in most developed countries, ought to be provided. The economists' policy prescription for redistributing income is the lump sum payment in theory and the de-coupled income payment in practice. This transfer mechanism achieves the income objective without incurring unnecessary deadweight costs and it is not trade distorting in theory and minimally trade distorting in practice. If implemented universally, de-coupled income payments would remove the need in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture for there to be the 'three pillars' of market access, domestic support and export assistance. By contrast, governments, particularly in the developed countries, have chosen to support farmers' incomes through direct intervention in markets by manipulating prices or quantities and, in doing so, they have needed to restrict imports and, occasionally, to subsidise exports, in order to achieve their objective. When the countries using this approach are large, in the sense that they affect international market prices, then prices, trade volumes and the social welfare of individual countries become a function of the instruments chosen and the levels at which they are set. 10 For an elaboration and discussion, see OECD (1995).
More efficient outcomes would be generated by the choice of de-coupled instruments, if income support is the objective.
However, this normative approach to policy analysis and economic advice fails dismally in most instances to predict what is observed in practice about governments' choice of instruments. It fails because it is assumed in the analysis that government acts as an omniscient planner, given its non-economic objective, pursuing the national interest.
Because of this failure to predict both in agricultural policy and in trade policy, some analysts have turned to a political economy approach in order to explain why governments do what they are observed to do. Dillon et al. (1991, p. 93) have argued that political economy provides a framework rather than a theory for analysing government intervention. Indeed there are many theories of political economy but they all have in common the proposition that government should be modelled as a rational, self-interested participant in the economy in a manner analogous to rational, self-interested consumers and producers. They differ on what is assumed about the government's objective function and the constitutional framework within which government operates. The objective might be defined in terms of maximising political support with the choice of instrument dependent upon the degree of obfuscation which it generates for the losers and the amount of rent it transfers to the intended beneficiaries.
11
In the political economy framework it is possible to explain why the targeting rule is mostly ignored and why domestic objectives are often sought through instruments of trade policy. In the agricultural sector, prior to the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, non-tariff barriers were amongst the instruments of choice, even although the objectives were domestic. For example, the twin domestic objectives of the level and the stability of farm incomes could have been achieved through taxpayer-funded, de-coupled income payments together with various private risk-reduction strategies employed by producers using forward or futures markets or through insurance contracts. Instead, governments invariably chose to raise domestic prices as a way of raising the level of incomes and to insulate the domestic market from the perceived vagaries of international markets, through quotas or sliding tariffs, without regard to the effect of these instruments on international markets. Stabilisation of the domestic market was achieved at the expense of greater instability in international markets. 12 Depending upon the instrument chosen to raise domestic prices, the domestic costs were borne by domestic taxpayers and food consumers, although probably neither group realised that this was the case, while the beneficiaries (farm groups) were well aware of the benefits.
In the normative approach the focus is on identifying the optimal instrument to achieve the non-economic objective based upon the criterion of economic efficiency. The objective itself is not subject to analysis. In the political economy approach the focus is again on the choice of instrument but now it is based upon a political criterion. However, neither of these approaches appears to be adequate to explain the approach of some governments to non-trade concerns. These appear to be based largely on a set of social norms which differ substantially from the social norms of those countries which believe that economic principles should apply equally to the agricultural sector as to other sectors. 13 In particular, governments in the former category appear to act as if economic efficiency were not an objective at all. For example, countries in the former group do not approach multifunctionality in a positive way, i.e., they do not consider the characteristics of joint-ness of outputs (private or public) to be a feature of economic activity in general but believe it to be special to agriculture. Instead, for them, multifunctionality is a normative concept specific to agriculture: 'agriculture as an activity is entrusted with fulfilling certain functions in society' (OECD 2001, p. 9) . From this perspective, multifunctionality is a policy objective and one which, it is argued, can only be achieved through the continued use of pricedistorting instruments. A vibrant agricultural sector then becomes an instrument to achieve a higher-level objective for society.
Thus, there are two disjoint sets of countries: those in the category "Article 20
Approach" and others in the category "Market-only Approach" (see WTO 2000) . For the first set, multifunctionality is bound up with the joint-ness of the commodity and noncommodity outputs of agriculture and with the fundamental question of whether 'the actual provisions under the URAA are sufficient to let agriculture play its specific role and fulfil the multiple objectives assigned to it by societies.' (WTO 2000, p. 5) For the second set, the objectives sought by the first group are believed to be attainable through non-market distorting instruments but this position is not accepted by the first group. Hence, there is an 12 For a discussion of the domestic stabilisation effects of different trade instruments, see Lloyd and Falvey (1985) . 13 For a discussion of the importance of social norms as an underpinning for economics, see Basu (2000) , particularly chapter 4.
impasse as neither set of countries appears to want to compromise either philosophically or pragmatically.
Therefore, in the absence of governments' willingness unilaterally to pursue their objectives for agriculture through the use of non-trade distorting instruments, there is a clear need for enforceable international trade rules which moderate or which prevent governments from using instruments which distort trade, and which thereby, reduce social welfare and which prevent the efficient use of the world's resources.
Why the GATT/WTO is Necessary
With the exceptions of Australia and New Zealand, governments in the developed countries have been unwilling for several reasons unilaterally to reduce significantly their support to farmers (Table 1) . Two features of this Would it have been the case, in the absence of the tightened GATT rules, that the reductions in overall support would have occurred, and would a decreasing proportion of that support have come from market price instruments? At least in the case of the European Union, it is accepted, although not universally, that the reforms of the Common Agriculture Policy which were begun in 1993 were largely the result of the outside pressure created by the need to conclude the Uruguay Round. Given the even wider agenda in the current Round, which includes the several contentious, non-trade concerns, there has to be a presumption that there is a need for the WTO. In the absence of an enforceable set of trade rules, delivered through the Dispute Settlement Body, the chaos of the years prior to 1995 could well return with consequential substantial welfare losses for most countries. 
Conclusions
There is a considerable dispersion amongst governments in their approach to agricultural policy. At one extreme are governments which limit their attention to the pursuit 14 Importing countries have benefited from the lower level of import prices for some agricultural products caused by export subsidies and the greater levels of production in the EU and the U.S. encouraged by their respective agricultural policies. Hence, a return to the conditions pertaining pre-1995 could be to the benefit of importing countries, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, third-country exporters would experience a loss.
of economic efficiency within their agricultural sectors: at the other are governments which regard their agricultural sectors as fulfilling a higher level social objective without regard to efficiency. Given these quite different positions, it is proving difficult to find any middle ground in the current negotiations in the WTO which were initiated under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
The economic theory of distortions and welfare can make a contribution to reconciling these two positions. It can do so: first, by separating policy objectives from policy instruments; second, by demonstrating that at least as many instruments as objectives are necessary to achieve the objectives; and third, by using transfer efficiency as a basis for ranking instruments to achieve a given objective. When there is only one objective, this analysis is straightforward; when there are several, it becomes more difficult but not infeasible. At issue for governments, in the context of the negotiations, is whether or not the policy implications of this type of analysis form a legitimate basis for negotiated outcomes.
Obviously, most economists believe that the conclusions are valid and that they would help, even if only as a structure within which to clarify the issues and the alternative means of achieving given ends.
The basic objectives of the negotiations, as re-iterated in the Doha Declaration, are to strive for a fair and market-oriented international trading system for agricultural products, while keeping in mind non-trade concerns. However, it would appear for some governments in developed and developing countries, that non-trade concerns receive a greater weight in their objective function than the economic efficiency to be achieved through a liberalised trading system. But the link between the pursuit of non-trade concerns by market-distorting instruments and the consequent lack of fairness for developing and least-developed countries, appears not to have been made by former group of governments. For the latter group of countries, an essential element of fairness in international markets for agricultural products is improved access to developed country, as well as to developing country, markets. The conclusion from the theory of distortions and welfare shows that the twin pursuits of nontrade concerns domestically and of fairness internationally are compatible. Unfortunately, governments which emphasise non-trade concerns, as well as some of those which do not, are ignoring the international spill-over effects of the price policy instruments that they insist on continuing to use, and in so doing are ignoring alternative and feasible ways of achieving their objectives. Fundamentally, however, they are diminishing the possibility in the Doha
